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Abstract
The paper presents a theoretical model for analysis of the imper-
fect observability of central bank preferences by the private sector
on the decisions taken by the monetary authority, and therefore on
the ination rate. It examines in particular the connection which,
in the presence of a time inconsistency problem, arises between the
observability of the monetary institutions goals and its equilibrium
strategies. The model yields innovative results from the technical and
economic points of view. From the technical point of view, the study
of equilibrium strategies in a simple signalling model allows derivation
of the equilibrium outcomes of a monetary policy game already ex-
amined by DAmato and Pistoresi (1996) and Sibert (2002), without
the restrictions that those authors impose on the basis of the types
of monetary institution. It is thus possible to identify the conditions
on the models parameters under which a pure separating equilib-
rium arises, and the conditions under which there instead exists a
hybrid equilibrium in which some types of Central Bankers adopt
separating strategies (Vickers 1986; DAmato and Pistoresi 1996; Sib-
ert 2002) while others adopt pooling strategies similar to those studied
by Backus and Dri¢ ll (1985). From an economic point of view, the
paper shows a number of relations that arise, in equilibrium, between
the degree of observability and transparency of the Central Bankers
goals and the ination rate set by the Central Banker.
JEL Classication numbers: E31; E58; E61
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Central Bank.
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1 Introduction
As shown by the literature on the institutional designs of monetary pol-
icy, there are various arguments in favour of delegating monetary policy
to agents independent of the government, within an institutional frame-
work which not only guarantees that independence but also imposes precise
objectives and constraints on the operations of a Central Banker. The ad-
vantages of delegation to an independent banker more ination-adverse than
the government, or society, arise from the desire to prevent the stagation
problems usually associated with time inconsistency and the prevalence of
a discretion equilibrium. However, this approach has been criticised in
light of considerations concerning the distribution of the benets and costs
of ination within a society made up of heterogeneous agents. For exam-
ple, from the positive point of view, Adam Posen (1995) argues that what
matters in the long period in the struggle against ination is the presence
of a strong nancial sector with an interest in price stability and willing
and able to induce the monetary policy authorities to pursue that objec-
tive. From this standpoint, the independence of the Central Bank and its
ination-control targets are unconnected with the interests of society as a
whole, and the convenience of a particular institutional arrangement derives
not from normative considerations but from the political inuence of a par-
ticular interest group. This point of view has been analysed further in the
literature that connects the design of monetary institutions with the eld of
political economics (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Drazen, 2000; Alesina
and Gatti, 1995).
Yet the view of institutions as produced by special interests politicsis
not necessarily antithetical to the credibility-based approach (Kydland and
Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983; Rogo¤, 1985; Lohmann, 1992).
It is possible in fact to hypothesise that even in the presence of heteroge-
neous agents (debitors versus creditors, nancial system versus rmssys-
tem, agents whose wages are xed by long-period contacts versus agents
whose remuneration is xed in exible markets), the time-inconsistency
problem and its solution of strategic delegation (commitment) continues
to play a signicant role in the design of monetary policy institutions.
An aspect which requires investigation is the problem of the observability
of commitment and the possible role assumed by the heterogeneity of agents
in this regard. As well known, the results obtained in the literature on com-
mitment and observability (Bonanno, 1992; Bagwell, 1995; Fershtman and
Kalai, 1997) show that the benets deriving to a player from constraining
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its actions to a commitment via delegation are essentially connected to the
likelihood that the commitment will be observed by the other players.1
This paper analyses a simple time inconsistency model in which institu-
tional reforms i.e. the process of strategic delegation to an independent
Banker constrained in its decisions to monetary stability goals come about
in the presence of agents heterogeneous in their ability, or willingness, to
invest resources in order to observe and understand those reforms. In the
presence of agents not all of which are able to observe and understand the
e¤ects of reform of the monetary institutions on the behaviour of the Cen-
tral Banker in terms of its decisions, monetary policy is implemented in the
presence of the Bankers partial private information, with respect to private
agents, about monetary policy objectives.
The aim of the paper is therefore to analyse the e¤ect of the imperfect
observability of Central Bank preferences by the private sector on the deci-
sions taken by the monetary authority and therefore on the ination rate.
In the case of a Bankers multiperiod appointment and imperfect observ-
ability of its goals on the part of private agents, the latter, to the extent
that they are not directly informed about those goals, may infer them from
the decisions taken by the Central Banker.
The paper considers in particular the case of an economy in which a
Central Banker is appointed for two periods and information about its ob-
jectives is distributed in society as follows: an exogenous fraction p of agents
has incentives and the capacity to invest resources in the observation of the
objectives assigned to the independent institution and take account of that
information when formulating their expectations about the ination rate.
A fraction 1   p of agents do not have this information and therefore in
the rst period formulate expectations about the ination rate according to
their a priori beliefs about the type of Banker, while in the second period
their expectations are conditioned by the Bankers behaviour in the rst
period.
1This in fact is the result obtained by Fershtman and Kalai (1997) and it contrasts
with the one obtained by Bagwell (1995). In this model, there is a small probability of
error in the players information about his opponents actions. This small probability
makes the information useless, and the result of the game is identical to that in a game
without information. By contrast, in Fershtman and Kalias (1997) model there is a
small probability that the player is informed about his opponent. In this case, this small
probability drastically a¤ects the outcome of the game: that is, unlike in Bagwells model,
advantages are obtained from the introduction of a commitment via delegation even when
the delegation is not perfectly observable.
3
The monetary policy game describe therefore divides into two periods
and has the characteristics typical of signalling games. The temporal se-
quence of the decisions is as follows: at time t = 0 monetary policy is del-
egated to an independent Banker with particular preferences regarding the
trade-o¤ between ination and output (unemployment) and which remains
in o¢ ce for two periods. At time t = 1, given the agentsexpectations, the
Central Banker xes an ination rate considering that future expectations
(at time t = 2) of fraction 1  p (those that do not observe the BCs prefer-
ences at t = 0) will be conditioned by observation of the current decision of
the Central Banker. At time t = 2, the Central Banker decides the money
supply, the macroeconomic results are achieved and the game concludes.
Introducing the hypothesis of heterogeneity in the private sector, in a
standard monetary policy model (Vickers, 1986),extended to the case of
a continuous support of types (Mailath, 1987)enables one to analyse the
behaviour of a just-appointed policymaker, or of institutions created ex
novo at a given point in time and in a particular place.2 The presence in
the economy of private agents with a di¤erent degree of observability with
respect to the Central Bankers preferences gives rise to a private learning
process which generates more or less strong incentives for the just-appointed
policymaker, or the new institutions, to acquire a reputation.
With respect to the previous literature (DAmato and Pistorese, 1996;
Sibert, 2002), therefore, the contribution of this paper from a technical
point of view consists in two extensions: rst, it considers the case of agent
heterogeneity in terms of the information set; second, it studies and re-
solves the game without imposing restrictions on the support of the distri-
bution of the agentsbeliefs across the possible types of Central Banker.
These extensions will enable me to characterize the nature and properties
of a semi-separatingequilibrium (also called partial pooling), and also to
study the relationships between monetary policy strategies in the presence
of time inconsistency and the degree of transparency and observability of
the objectives of a Central Banker in a simple economy.
The results of the model show that, in the case of an economy character-
ized by a large number of private agents, about which the Central Banker
possesses private information, the hypothesis of a continuum of Central
2An extension of signalling models for monetary policy to the case of a continuous
support of types is also present in DAmato and Pistoresi (1996) and Sibert (2002). Both
models substantially conrm Vickers result (separating equilibrium) that the presence
of wet types disciplines the behaviour of tough types.
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Bankers signies that it is not economically convenient for the tougher
types (strongly ination-averse), within a given support, to separate them-
selves from each other, because this gives rise to high signalling costs3 ,
whereas it is instead optimal for them join with the type which sets a nil
ination rate. Instead, each wettype (those most sensitive to the level of
economic activity) in the support, obviously excluding the worst possible
type, separates from the one closest to it.4
Vice versa, as the private sectors uncertainty about the true identity of
the monetary decreases (economy characterized by a large number of agents
informed about the type of Central Banker), the model converges on the
results obtained by DAmato and Pistoresi (1996) and Sibert (2002): that
is, it produces a complete separating equilibrium, so that once again the
presence of wet types disciplines the behaviour of tough types.
The introduction of partial observability also has implications for the
strategic delegation that would emerge in equilibrium. The presence of
signalling costs substantially alters the incentives for commitment and de-
pends on the degree of observability. This study will not concern itself with
deriving the governments optimal strategy. It restricts itself to pointing
out that, in the case where the economy is characterized by situations in
which observation by the private sector is close to being perfect, introduc-
ing a commitment mechanism into monetary policy may be a way to evade
signalling costs. Otherwise, there may arise commitment costs su¢ ciently
high to induce the government to reduce the use of delegation and assign
ination-control targets less stringent than in the case of high transparency.
This interpretation may help explain why in the industrialized countries,
where institutional conditions are such to guarantee the high observability
of the policy-makers preferences, monetary policy is often characterized
by the presence of legal rules, or by institutions created by constitutional
laws (Central Banks independent from political power, pegging of the ex-
change rate to a strong currency, etc.) which essentially serve the purpose
of specifying a partial commitment mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
monetary policy game, while in Section 3 the model is solved for a separating
equilibrium and a pooling equilibrium in the monetary policy game. A
number of simulations are performed in Section 4 in order to analyse, other
3 In monetary policy models the cost of the signal is represented by the fall of the
employment level below the natural rate.
4 In substance, the equilibrium obtained represents a partial pooling.
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conditions remaining equal, the impact on the ination rate of an increase
in the observability of the Central Bankers preferences. Section 5 sets out
the conclusions.
2 A monetary policy signalling game
The starting-point is the monetary authoritys pay-o¤ functions  which
are widely used in the literature and were proposed for the rst time by
Barro-Gordon (1983, a)  in which a welfare function is assigned for each
period t:
The welfare of the Central Banker (CB) in period t, depends on actual
ination and unexpected ination. We thus have the following functions:
Wt = w (t;t   et ) ; (1)
where t represents the ination rate in each period t, which by hypothesis
is completely controlled by the monetary authority, and et is the ination
expected by the private sector. It is therefore assumed that positive ination
is a cost for the Central Banker, whilst so-called surprise ination, t et ;
gives rise to welfare5 .
To simplify the analysis, it is also assumed that the welfare function
is linear in unemployment, rather than quadratic as in Barro and Gordon
(1983, a). This assumption, which has been made by Barro and Gordon
(1983, b) and Vickers (1986), is attractive for our model, in that it ensures
that the Banker has a dominant strategy during the nal period in which
it is in o¢ ce, and therefore enables the expected ination of the previous
period to be considered a constant. Hence Wt has the following functional
form:
Wt =  1
2
2t +  (t   et ) (2)
where   0 is the parameter of preferences that the Banker assigns to
unexpected ination, and therefore to the trade-o¤ between ination and
unemployment, and t = 1; 2:
This parameter  is only in part private information for the Central
Banker. In fact, from the point of view of private agents, for the fraction of
5"Surprise ination" is a benet for the monetary authority because it pushes un-
employment below the natural rate, which is assumed to be too high. Alternatively, the
benet can be interpreted in terms of advantages connected with the presence of debt
stock issued in nominal terms or short-period rigidity of the tax system. In the rest of
the analysis, the model will use mainly the rst of these interpretations.
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agents equal to 1  p, it is distributed assuming a priori beliefsabout the
distribution function F () dened in a continuous support  2 [a;ABC ];6
whilst the fraction p of private agents possesses complete information about
the type of Banker because it observes  at the moment when the Central
Banker is appointed and then behaves rationally.
There are various reasons for considering the private sector as divided
into two parts. the principal one relates to Posens hypothesis that a crucial
role is played in society by net nominal creditors (for example, banks and
nancial companies) which have a greater interest in gathering information
about the preferences of a just-appointed policymaker.7
The temporal structure of events is the usual sequence of monetary pol-
icy games8 : the private agents form their expectations about the ination
rate of the rst period, e1 (rst stage), the Central Banker observes 
e
1 and
then chooses the actual ination of the rst period 1 (second stage). In
the rst stage of the second period, the private agents form their ination
expectation, which will be: e2 = pE (2j) + (1   p)E (2j1); that is,
the fraction of informed private agents formulates expectations about the
ination rate which are conditioned by the type of Banker  observed when
it takes o¢ ce, whilst the fraction of private agents uninformed at the mo-
ment when the Banker takes o¢ ce will form its expectations on the basis
of what it has observed in the previous period, i.e. 1, but not : Finally,
in the second stage of the second period, the Central Banker observes e2;
and chooses the actual ination.
In formulating their expectations conditioned by their information set,
the private agents minimize the cost of ination rate forecast error by means
of the following quadratic function of the pay-o¤s for each period t:
ut =   (t   et )2 (3)
6Both the distribution function and the support constitute knowledge shared by the
players and can be arbitrarily dened. However, it can be shown that the conditions for
the existence of a separating equilibrium, under the hypothesis of a continuum of types,
can restrict the support (Mailath, 1987).
7Alternatively, the division of the private sector into two parts can be seen as the pres-
ence in the economy of a fraction of agents p which sign long-period nominal contracts in
anticipation of monetary policy decisions, and which is necessarily interested in knowing
the Central Bankers preferences when it takes o¢ ce.
8See: Backus e Dri¢ ll (1985), Vickers (1986), DAmato e Pistoresi (1996), Sibert
(2002).
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The solution concept used to determine the optimal strategies is the
perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Thus obtained is a pair of ination rates
played by the Central Banker, s = f1 () ; 2 ()g, and a pair of ex-
pected ination rates played by each private agent, e = fe1; e2g, where
e1 = pE (1j) + (1  p)E (1) represents the ination expected in the
rst period by the entire private sector. It is calculated on the basis of the
distribution function of the a priori beliefs of the uninformed private agents
and is instead conditioned by the type  of Central Banker for the informed
private agents. e2 = pE (2j) + (1  p)E (2j1) represents the ination
in the second period, which for the informed agents once again depends on
the type , whilst for the uninformed agents it depends on their inference
of the Central Bankers preferences based on the ination rate observed in
the rst period.
Finally, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the players do not
discount the future, so that the function of the pay-o¤s across the entire
time horizon of the game is: W =W1 +W2:9
3 Equilibrium of the monetary policy signalling
game
The BCs optimal strategy can be determined by solving the game back-
wards. In fact, the equilibrium value of the ination rate for the second
stage of the second period can be easily obtained by solving the following
programme
max
2
W2 =  1
2
22 +  (2   e2) (4)
the rst-order condition of which is:
2 =  (5)
In other words, in period t = 2, there is no future to consider, and the
Central Bankers dominant strategy consequently corresponds to (5).
At this point in the rst stage of the second period, the informed fraction
of private agents p xes the expected ination rate on the basis of the type 
that it has observed at the moment of the appointment: E (2j) = , while
9Both Vickers (1986) and DAmato and Pistoresi (1996) solve the game considering
this hypothesis.
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the uninformed private agents (1  p) anticipate the choice of ination rate
2 =  and minimize the forecasting error by formulating their modied
expectations on the basis of Bayesrule, that is, on the basis of the ination
rate observed in the rst period: E (2j1) = E (j1) = ^:
The (1 p) fraction of agents conjecture that in the rst period the Cen-
tral Bankers strategy is 1 = ()10 in the case of a separating equilibrium;
instead, 1 = 0 in the case of a pooling equilibrium11 . From this it follows
that the 1  p agents infer the typeof BC from their observation of 1:
In general ^ = 
s
2 8 1 = 0 and ^ =  1(1) 8 0 < 1  ABC , where s
is such that (s) = 0: that is, it is the point which divides the separating
region from the pooling region. Hence, given the a priori beliefs about
the typesthat the BC may assume, the expectations regime for the entire
private sector can be summarized as follows::
e2 = p+ (1  p)^ for 0 < 1  ABC
e2 = p+ (1  p)
s
2 for 1 = 0
(6)
Lemma 1 If the Central Bankers strategy in the rst period is partial pool-
ing, in the second period the private sectors expectations regime and the
BCs strategy are respectively dened by (6) and (5).
As regards the rst period, expected ination is given by:
e1 = pE (1j) + (1  p)E (1) (7)
In this case, too, it is necessary to consider the di¤erence between the pooling
region and the separation region.
In the pooling case 0    s from which it follows that () = 0:
Consequently, the expected ination will be:
e1 = p0 + (1  p)
Z s
0
0f()d = 0 (8)
Instead, in the separating case s    ABC ; and therefore 1 =
():Consequently, the expected ination will be:
e1 = p() + (1  p)
Z ABC
s
()f()d = p() + (1  p) (9)
10This is a biunivocal function: that is, there is a one-to-one correspondence on the
space of the types and that of the strategies (see Mailath, 1987).
11This is a constant function of the space of the types and that of the strategies
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and in the entire support one therefore has:
e1 = p() + (1  p)
Z ABC
0
()f()d = p() + (1  p) (10)
In the second stage of the rst period, the Central Banker regards ex-
pectations as given, but takes account of learning by the (1   p) fraction
of private agents when they formulate expectations about ination in the
second period, and may therefore have an incentive to signal its type.12
Given the equilibrium result of the second period, the reduced form of
the Central Bankers pay-o¤ function in the rst period is:
max
1
W1 =  1
2
21 + (1 
e
1) 
2
2
+ [  p  (1  p) ^] (11)
Using the denition of the strategy for separating equilibrium, 1 = (),
and the Bayesrule, ^ =  1(1),13one obtains the rst-order condition for
the Central Banker:
 +   (1  p)d^
d
= 0 (12)
which, evaluated in equilibrium, at the point  = ^ for s    ABC ; de-
termines the following rst-order homogeneous, non-linear di¤erential equa-
tion, the solution of which satises a separating equilibrium:
d
d
=
(1  p)
   (13)
whilst for 0    s
() = 0 (14)
Equation (13) can be solved analytically by separating the variables and
integrating to obtain the implicit function that describes the separation
strategy. Selection of the relevant branch of the implicit function, as the
unique equilibrium of the separation strategy, can be done using Mailaths
second condition (1987, p. 1353)14 and an initial condition. The initial
12The two-period monetary policy game under examination therefore comprises a
single-period signalling game.
13This expresses the second-period beliefs of the uninformed private agents about the
type of Central Banker.
14The condition of type monotonicity enables one to establish that the relevant part
of the solution of the di¤erential equation has positive slope (for details see the section
in the Appendix).
10
value condition is given by the equality 
 
ABC

= 1
 
ABC

= ABC : that
is, in a separating equilibrium, the worst possible type of Central Banker
has no incentive to signal itself and xes the ination rate at the same level
as it would do if the game were with complete information.
In particular, given dd =
1 p
1  
and setting  = x; it follows that:  =
x; then: d = dx + xd; Consequently, after some algebraic steps it is
possible to rewrite (13) in the following separable form:
1

d =
1  x
1  p  x+ x2 dx (15)
Integrating both the members of (15) yields:Z
1

d =
Z
1  x
1  p  x+ x2 dx (16)
The integral of the right-hand side of (16) admits three solutions according
to whether  is greater than, less than, or equal to zero.15
The rst is with  < 0 that is  = 1   4(1   p) < 0; from which it
follows that p < 34 , and therefore that (16) is equal to:
log =  1
2
log
x2   x+ (1  p)+ 1
2
2p
3  4p arctan
2x  1
3  4p + c1 (17)
The second solution of the integral of (16) is whith  = 0 from which it
follows that p = 34 ; and therefore that (16) is equal to:
log =  1
2

x  1
2
 1
  log
x  12
+ c0 (18)
Finally, the third solution of the integral of (16) is whith  > 0 from which
it follows p > 34 and that:
log =  1
2
log
x2   x+ (1  p)+ 1
2
1p
4p  3 log
2x  1 p4p  32x  1 +p4p  3
+ c2
(19)
Consequently by eliminating the auxiliary variable x it obtain the nal form
implicit solution, in the original variables of (16) that also admits three
solutions.
15The Appendix shows in what intervals the integral equation (16) is veried.
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p1
a0 as
0
ABC
f(a)
p*
Figure 1: Case with p < 34 : Partial Pooling Equilibrium.
: ination level with complete information.
(): ination level in separating equilibrium.
The rst, with p < 34 ; is
log =  1
2
log




2
 




+ (1  p)
+ 1p3  4p arctan 2

   1
3  4p + c1
(20)
The second with p = 34 is:
log =  1
2



  1
2
 1
  log
   12
+ c0 (21)
The third with p > 34 , is:
log =  1
2
log




2
 




+ (1  p)
+
1
2
1p
4p  3 log
2   1 
p
4p  3
2   1 +
p
4p  3
+ c2 (22)
where c1; c0 and c2 respectively represent the integration constants that can
be obtained by setting the initial value condition 
 
ABC

= ABC .
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p1
a0 ABC
f(a)
p*
f = a2
1
Figure 2: Case whith p = 34 :Complete Separating Equilibrium.
: level with complete information.
(): ination level in separating equilibrium.
These solutions are such that the relevant branch of the separating strat-
egy is an increasing convex function whereby 0   ()  ;   ABC =
ABC ; and 1  p  0 <1:
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show, respectively for the various regimes of p, the
relevant part of the contourplot of the solution of equation (13) in the signal-
types space .
Proposition 1 If 0  p < 3=4; for an arbitrary support a;ABC of F (),
there exists a partial pooling equilibrium. In the interval

s; ABC

; where
s is dened by (s) = 0, there exists a separating equilibrium which satis-
es (13). The equilibrium strategies in this interval are therefore the follow-
ing: ss = fs1(); 2()g, es = fe1; e2g, where s1() = (), 2() = ,
e1() = p()+(1 p)E[()], e2() = pE(2 j )+(1 p)E(2 j 1) = .
In the interval [0; s] there exists a pooling equilibrium which satised (14).
The equilibrium strategies in this interval are therefore sp = fp1(); 2()g,
es = fe1; e2g, p1() = 0, 2() = , e1() = 0, e2() = p+(1  p)E();
where E() is dened as the expected value unconditioned by the distribution
function of the a priori beliefs. .
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p1
a0 ABC
f(a)
p*
f = a2
341 -+ p
Figure 3: Case with p > 34 : Complete Separating Equilibrium.
 : ination level with complete information..
 () : ination level in separating equilibrium.
In order to demonstrate that the separating equilibrium of Proposition
1 exists and is unique, one must consider both Mailaths (1987) regularity
conditions and the second-order condition on (11) satied for  > s (see
the Appendix for the derivation of these conditions). In the pooling case,
the strategy expressed by (14) will instead be an equilibrium if there is no
incentive for the monetary authority to deviate from that equilibrium, given
specication of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. It must therefore be that:
wD() < wP () for 0    s16(see the Appendix for the proof)..
The Central Bankers separating strategy is such that, in the rst period,
the types falling in the interval

s; ABC

, will choose a lower ination
rate than in the case of complete information, thus reducing the inationary
bias. In other words, the risk that the public may revise its beliefs down-
wards serves as a commitment mechanism for the monetary authority. The
fraction of private agents (1 p) that is, those uninformed at the moment
of the Central Bankers appointment will anticipate this behaviour and in
16 In this signalling game there may exist a pooling equilibrium for the entire support
a;ABC

. This case is analysed in the Appendix.
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the rst period will set a lower level of expected ination.
The separating equilibrium breaks down in the part of the interval where
()  0 i.e. for  2 [0; s]17 . For all the types of Central Banker
comprised in this interval to separate themselves, they must play a negative
ination rate in the rst period, which implies a result worse than the
pooling case for 1 = 0. In other words, the signalling e¤ect, which reduces
ination in the rst period, becomes too costly for tough types, that is, for
0    s:
Hence, the di¤erence between the result obtained here and Vickers
(1981) result is that in Vickers the pooling equilibrium comes about with
a positive ination rate in the period t = 1, and the player with small
 (the toughest type) 18 may separate itself by playing a lower, though
still positive, ination rate. In Vickers, deviating, choosing to separate,
is always advantageous with respect to the pooling equilibrium. This does
not happen in the model considered here, where a hybrid pooling/separating
equilibrium is instead obtained..
One implication of the partial pooling equilibrium obtained is that there
are intermediatetypes which signal themselves more, and which are there-
fore those with the widest gap between the actual ination rate and the
time-consistent ination rate à la Barro-Gordon.
Proposition 2 If 3=4  p  1; for an arbitrary support a;ABC of F (),
in the interval

0; ABC

there exists a complete separating equilibrium.The
complete characterization of the separating equilibrium is given by the fol-
lowing strategies: ss = fs1(); 2()g, es = fe1; e2g, where s1() =
()19 , 2() = , 
e
1() = p() + (1   p)E[()], e2() = pE(2 j
) + (1  p)E(2 j 1) = .
In order to demonstrate that the separating equilibrium of Proposition
2 exists and is unique, it is once again necessary to bear in mind both
Mailaths (1987) regularity conditions and the second-order condition on
(11), satised for  > 0; both of which are derived in the Appendix..
The di¤erence of the result presented in Proposition 1 is that, in this
case, each type of Central Banker in the interval separates itself from the
17See the red segment in Figure 2-1.
18 In Vickersmodel there are two types of BC: toughand wet.
19More specically, if p = 3
4
; 1
2
 < () < . If p > 3
4
; 1+
p
4p 3
2
 < () < . See
the Appendix for the proof.
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one closest to it, unlike what happened previously20 .
A further conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of the di¤erent infor-
mation contexts in which the monetary policy game takes place (i.e. with
p S 34 ), is that the closer one approaches the case of the perfect observability
of the Central Bankers preferences  (i.e. with increasingly higher values of
p), the more the marginal cost of the signal decreases.21 . This is ensured by
both the monotonicity of  and the shift of s towards the origin (compare
in this regard Figures 1, 2 and 3).
In order to conrm this result, a comparative statics exercise to analyse,
as the number increases in the economy of private agents which observe
the Central Banker at the moment of its appointment, how the results of
the equilibria determined may change. From an analytical point of view,
this involves considering the total di¤erential of the implicit solution of the
di¤erential equation (13):
dF + dpFp = 0! d
dp
=  Fp
F
(23)
Unfortunately, it is analytically not possible to determine either the sign
of Fp or the sign of F unambiguously. Consequently, in the next section I
shall perform some simulations to determine the impact of a variation p on
the equilibrium determined.
4 Some simulations
This section reports some results obtained using simulations22 , in which
enable us to characterize the e¤ects of a variation in the exogenous variable
p: that is, the number of agents informed about the Bakers preferences at
the moment of its appointment, in dd =
(1 p)
  :
Given that our model focuses on the case in which the Central Bankers
preferences are only in part private information, we analyse the impact
on the equilibrium ination rate of an increase in the observability of the
Bankers preferences for the private sector. In other words, from an analyt-
ical point of view, we analyse ddp :
Figure 4 illustrates a numerical simulation of equation (13), which shows
the relevant part of the contour diagram of the equation, that is, the Central
20 In this case, for 0    s; the pooling equilibrium break down.
21This represents the marginal cost of setting the ination rate below the optimal level
of the complete information case, i.e. below :
16
Figure 4: Simulation 1: p = 0:1
Figure 5: Simulation 2: p = 0:2
17
Figure 6: Simulation 3: p = 0:5
Figure 7: Comparison of simulations 1, 2 and 3
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Bankers strategy. It will be noted that if p = 0:1, the separating strategy
() cuts the x-axis at the point s = 0:5:
Figure 5 shows, within the interval of the current parameters, the impact
of an increase in observability (p = 0:2). In this case, s = 0:45:
Figure 6 shows the case of p = 0:5, and therefore s = 0:2:
Finally, Figure 7 considers the three simulations simultaneously in a sin-
gle graph. This suggest that ddp > 0 and that
ds
dp  0. That is to say,
if within an economy, the number of agents informed at t = 0 about the
Bankers preferences increases, the Central Banker distorts less. Hence the
ination rate grows progressively higher than in the incomplete informa-
tion case (p = 0), so that the results presented in the previous section are
conrmed.
5 Conclusions
The paper has presented an extension of the monetary policy models pre-
sented by DAmato and Pistoresi (1996) and by Sibert (2002) to the case in
which the private sector is not homogeneous in regard to the observability of
the Central Bankers preferences. More precisely, it has assumed that there
are two di¤erent fractions of private agents: one completely informed about
the type of Central Banker when it is appointed; and one about which the
Central Banker has private information. The results obtained show that
the information context and the degree of transparency and observability
of the processes that lead to the strategic delegation of monetary policy
signicantly inuence the nature of the equilibrium.
In the case in which the economy is characterized by high uncertainty
among private agents about the identify of the Central Banker (i.e. an econ-
omy with a small number of agents that observe the type  at the moment
of the appointment), one obtains a hybrid pooling/separating equilibrium in
which the wetter types separate from each other, while the tougher types
behave as an intermediate type which chooses an ination rate equal to
zero. In equilibrium, therefore, no Central Banker utilizes a strategy with
an ination rate less than zero (as shown by Figure 1). This is in substance
is an example in which, even though there are innite types of Banker and
innite actions, each type does not select a di¤erent type in order that it
22The simulations were obtained using the Mathematica 4.0 program.
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can be identied. In e¤ect, only the less ination-averse types reveal their
identity unequivocally to the public.
In the case where one moves towards situations of the monetary au-
thoritys perfect observability in other words, there is a large number of
agents informed about type  in the economy  the pooling equilibrium
breaks down and there emerges a complete separating equilibrium where
each type selects an ination rate lower than that selected by the wet type
closest to it. In both equilibria (partial pooling and complete separating),
it is the intermediate types that greatly reduce the ination rate compared
to the case in which preferences are fully known (Barro-Gordon).
As pointed out in the introduction, the observability of commitment and
the nature of the Bankers equilibrium strategies inuence the design of the
governments strategic delegation.
An interesting problem for future research is modication of the game by
introducing an initial stage in which a continuum of governments appoint a
Central banker whose preferences are not perfectly observable by the private
sector. In this case, does a government with certain preferences have the
incentive to appoint Bankers with preferences di¤erent from its own?
6 Appendix
6.1 Regularity conditions on the Central Bankers wel-
fare function
As said in Section 2, in order to demonstrate that the separating equilibrium
exists and is unique, one must check Mailaths (1987) regularity conditions
dened on equation (11), which are: belief monotonicity, type monotonicity,
and single crossing.
Belief monotonicity condition
~Wb =  (1  p) < 0
This condition represents the Central bankers incentive to be believed
toughin combating ination. In e¤ect, (1  p) represents the marginal
cost of the loss of reputation; given , the marginal cost is decreasing in p.
Type monotonicity condition
~W1 = 1 > 0
20
This condition represents the marginal benet due to the ination sur-
prise, for each given belief, that private agents have about the type of Cen-
tral Banker. This condition states that the greater the weight that the
monetary assigns to unemployment, the greater, at the margin, is the posi-
tive e¤ect of ination for each given belief that 1  p agents have about the
type of Central Banker.
Single crossing condition
@( ~W1=
~W^)=@ =  1=( )2(1   p) < 0, which is satised in that it
does not change sign for: 1 = () > 0; that is, we restrict the analysis to
positive ination rates. The marginal substitution rate between an increase
in ination in the rst period and the consequent loss of reputation in the
second period is an increasing monotonic function in : In other words, the
wetter the Central Banker, the greater the cost that it must bear in terms
of future reputation for one additional unit of current ination.
The second-order conditions
A su¢ cient condition for (13) to be a local maximum for (11) is the
following (see Mailath, 1987, p. 1355): 0 ~W1 + ~Wb  0. Consequently,
given that 1 2 , and ~Wb =  (1   p) and ~W1 = 1, we obtain the
following restriction in : 0 > 1  p: Thus from (13), the restriction of the
separating equilibrium to the support interval is such that:  > 0.
A su¢ cient condition for (13) to be a local maximum for (11) is the
following (see Mailath, 1987, p. 1355):
0
n
~W1  

~W1=
~W^

~Wbo  0; which is satised for 0 n1  ( ) o 
0; that is, 0    :
6.2 Separating equilibrium for di¤erent information con-
texts
The integral equation:
R 1

1
d =
R 1
x
1 x
1 p x+x2 dx is dened for di¤erentin-
tervals according to whether :  S 0:23
With  < 0 i.e. p < 34 ; the fraction of the integral in dx is always
veried with, 0 < x < 1, from which follows:Z 1

1

d =
Z 1
x
1  x
1  p  x+ x2 dx
23Where 0 < x < 1 and 0    1:In e¤ect, it is assumed that the support is equal to
one.
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the solution of which, as we have seen, is equal to:
log =  1
2
log




2
 




+ (1  p)
+ 1p3  4p arctan 2

   1
3  4p + c1:
Hence if  = ABC e () = ABC it is possible to calculate c1 :
logABC =   12 log j1  pj+ 1p3 4p arctan 1p3 4p + c1
c1 = logA
BC + 12 log j1  pj   1p3 4p arctan 1p3 4p :
Normalizing for ABC = 1 one obtains:
c1 =
1
2 log j1  pj   1p3 4p arctan 1p3 4p :
Solving in order to determine the critical value of ; such that (s) = 0
in the period t = 1 and 2 = s in the period t = 2, one nds that for p < 34 :
logs = 1p
3 4p arctan
 1p
3 4p   1p3 4p arctan 1p3 4p
from which one obtains:
s = e
  2p
3 4p arctan
1p
3 4p
Hence if the Central Banker has completely private information (i.e. p = 0),
s the point dividing the separating region from the pooling region will be
equal to 0:546:24
Whith p = 34 ; the fraction of the interval in dx is veried only if:
 >  >
1
2

because the initial condition is violated for values  <
1
2 :Hence:Z 1

1

d =
Z 1
x> 12
1  x
1  p  x+ x2 dx
This can be easily demonstrated by means of the following limit:
lim
x! 12+
1
2
 1
x  12
  log
x  12
+ c0 =  1
so that from (21) one has:
log =  1 =)  = 0
24This results is conrmed by a numerical simulation of (13) whith p = 0:
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Q.E.D.
Finally, with p > 34 ;
25 the fraction of the integral in dx is veried only
if:
 >  >
1 +
p
4p  3
2
;
from which follows:Z 1

1

d =
Z 1
x> 1+
p
4p 3
2
1  x
1  p  x+ x2 dx:
The starting-point for proving the above is:
log =  1
2
log
x2   x+ (1  p)+ 1
2
1p
4p  3 log
2x  1 p4p  32x  1 +p4p  3
+ c2
(24)
where c2 with  = ABC and () = ABC is:
c2 = logA
BC +
1
2
j1  pj   1
2
1p
4p  3 log
1 p4p  31 +p4p  3
 :
Considering now:
lim
x! 1 
p
4p 3
2
della(24) =   12 ln (0)+
1
2
1p
4p 3 ln
 1 p4p 3 1 p4p 31 p4p 3 1+p4p 3 + c2 = log
from which one obtains:
log = +1 =)  = +1
which is a contradiction.
Consider (24) once again. After short algebraic steps, this can be written
in the following form:
 p4p  3 log 2x  1 +p4p  3 p4p  3 log 2x  1 p4p  3+
+log
2x  1 p4p  3  log 2x  1 +p4p  3+ 2p4p  3  c2 =
2
p
4p  3 log++p4p  3 log   14 ;
25 In this case, the roots of x will be:
x =
1p4p  3
2
i.e. x 2
h
0; 1 
p
4p 3
2
i
[
h
1 p4p 3
2
; 1
i
:
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the limit for for which with x tending to 1+
p
4p 3
2 is:
lim
x! 1 
p
4p 3
2
log =  1 =)  = 0
Q.E.D.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 provide a graphical illustration of the main analytical
results for the various information contexts.
6.3 Incentives for the Central Banker to deviate from
the pooling equilibrium
It was stressed in Section 2 that for the strategy expressed by (14) to be a
pooling equilibrium, it is necessary that:
wD() < wP () per 0    s: (25)
That is, for (14) to be part of a pooling equilibrium, there must be no
incentive for the monetary authority to deviate from a zero ination rate.
It is therefore necessary to calculate the welfare from deviation and the
welfare from the equilibrium strategy. The welfare from deviation, in the
region 0    s; is:
 1
2
21 + 

1   (1  p)
  1
2
22 + 

2   p  (1  p) 1(1)

: (26)
The rst-order condition on (26) is:
 1 +   (1  p) db
d1
= 0: (27)
It follows from the rst-order condition that 1 =    (1   p)  (1 p) !
1 = . Moreover, one intuits that the optimal deviation is never denite.
The welfare from the equilibrium strategy (in other words from pooling)
is::

 (1  p)  1
2
2 + 

  p  (1  p)
s
2

(28)
Given that the optimal deviation is never denite, we may directly compare
(26) (26) with (28), from which it is evident that (25) is always veried. It
is thus proved that the strategy expressed by (14) is a pooling equilibrium.
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6.4 Pooling equilibrium for the entire support
As said in Section 2, it is possible that the game has a pooling solution for
the entire support

a;ABC

, in correspondence to which all the possible
types of Central Banker converge on the choice of a single level of ination.
The welfare deriving from the pooling strategy is thus:
W p =  1
2
(p1)
2
+  [p1   pp1   (1  p)p1] 
1
2
22 +


2   p(e2 j )  (1  p)(e2 j p1)

(29)
On substituting 2 = , (e2 j ) =  and (e2 j p1) =  in (29) one
obtains:
WP =  1
2
(p1)
2
+ 1
2
2 +  (1  p) (  ) (30)
The p1 =  strategy will be part of a pooling equilibrium if there is no
incentive for the Central Banker to deviate from that level of ination,
given the specication of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
The specication of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs examined here is that
of passive conjectures,, according to which the 1   p fraction of private
agents infers nothing about the type of Central Banker from observation of
a deviation from the pooling strategy.
In this case, the incentive for deviation requires calculation of the pay-o¤
function, substituting 1 = D1 and
 
e2 j D1

=  in the Central Bankers
objective function. It is thus possible to obtain the following welfare function
deriving from the deviation strategy:
WD =  1
2
 
D1
2
+ 
 
D1   p1
  1
2
2 +  (1  p) (  ) (31)
On maximizing (31) with respect to D1 one then obtains the optimal devi-
ation, which is:
D1 =  (32)
Substituting(32) in (31) we obtain the welfare deriving from the optimal
deviation, which will be::
WD =  1
2
2 +  (  p1) 
1
2
2 +  (1  p) (  ) (33)
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The deviation will therefore be advantageous if WD > WP ; given respec-
tively by (33) and (30), so that after some algebraic steps we obtain:
(  p1)2 > 0 (34)
which is always satised, so that with passive conjectures, deviation from
the pooling equilibrium is always advantageous.
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